This paper studies uncertainty using the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters' data. We consider both inflation and real GDP growth forecasts at the micro level and explore forecast uncertainty using two alternative measures, i.e. conventional standard deviation of individual point forecasts and the median values of individual forecasters' uncertainty, which are based on subjective probability distributions of survey respondents. Our analysis indicates that individual inflation uncertainty is closely related to the output growth uncertainty. In forming expectations, individual forecasters seem to behave according to an uncertainty-augmented hybrid specification of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. We also find evidence that inflation uncertainty has a negative impact on economic activity by decreasing output growth and increasing inflation and lowering the price sensitiveness of aggregate supply.
Introduction
Expectations, which are crucial in price and wage formation and in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, have widely been analyzed using survey data (see Pesaran and Weale (2006) and Sinclair (2010) for basic references of survey-based studies). Since most of the studies have explored survey expectations on an aggregate level, we do not exactly know what happens behind the mean values of (point) forecasts. If, for example, the mean value of inflation forecasts increases, we do not know whether all forecasters increase their expectations by the same amount or whether only low inflation forecasters generally become high-inflation forecasters. Since only one expectations variable (usually the mean of point forecasts) is typically analyzed at a time, internal consistency of individual expectations has not been intensively analyzed. Most of the survey data are in the form of repeated cross-sections rather than genuine panel data, which restricts the analysis of expectations uncertainty.
Quite recently there has been a growing interest in examining the quantitative impact of uncertainty along the lines of e.g. Bloom (2009) . Recent and ongoing crises have clearly increased uncertainty and intuitively it sounds obvious that it has some effect on economic activity. It is only that thus far we have not had much hard evidence on this uncertainty -economic activity link. This point was also made by Robert Lucas in a 2011 Wall Street Journal interview, where he said he had "plenty of suspicion, but little evidence" that uncertainty was holding back the recovery. This paper tries just to provide more evidence.
Typically, surveys publish only mean values of individual forecasts and corresponding conventional standard deviations as a measure of expectations disagreement. Disagreement measures dispersion (or consensus) across individual forecasters. However, it does not express confidence associated with each individual expectation. It is possible that according to point forecasts inflation expectations are still firmly anchored, although public confidence in the likelihood that the inflation target will be achieved has reduced. Probability distributions of individual survey respondents are alternative measures of forecast uncertainty. They provide useful information about the probability of the future outcome being in the specific range. This paper studies individual professional forecasts using two alternative data sets. The analysis is mainly based on the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasts from 1999Q1 to 2012Q3, a period that includes both the pre-crisis years with relatively stable inflation rates and the crisis years with negative inflation rates. For comparison, inflation data for the US Survey of Professional Forecasts (US SPF) is also investigated. Two alternative measures of forecast uncertainty are used. In the empirical analysis, the determinants of inflation and output uncertainty measures are examined and, in particular, the relationship between these two is scrutinized. As for the core analyses, we investigate the impact of inflation uncertainty on price developments within the New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship using a micro-data-based panel approach. As an alternative, and completing approach we use a Lucas-type of supply function in order to evaluate the impact of inflation uncertainty on output growth. Both of these analyses give strong support to the idea that (inflation) uncertainty has a negative and nontrivial effect on inflation and output.
First, we briefly describe the data in section 2. Then we analyze the inflation uncertainty in section 3, and the impact of uncertainty on inflation and output growth in section 4. Finally, some concluding remarks follow in section 5.
The data
Since the beginning of 1999 the European Central Bank has conducted a quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECB SPF). In this survey the ECB asks a panel of approximately 75 forecasters for their short-and long-term views of HICP inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment in the euro area. Respondents represent financial sector, non-financial research institutes and employer or employee organizations in the European Union (EU). Contrary to many other surveys, the ECB SPF survey provides both fixed event and fixed horizon forecasts for different time horizons (terminology is from Dovern et al 2009) . Fixed event forecast refers to a certain calendar year (for example, the next calendar year) and fixed horizon forecast to horizon a certain time period ahead (like four quarters ahead). In addition to the point estimates, probabilities surrounding point estimates (i.e. density forecasts) for all variables and all horizons are published 2,3 .
The data (actual data and four quarter-ahead expectations) are illustrated in Figure 1 . relationship between these measures is scrutinized in more detail in Table 1 . From this table, we can see that that there is quite close relationship between inflation and output growth forecast uncertainties. Thus, the explanatory power of a simple regression model for inflation uncertainty is above 0.6.
Signs of increasing uncertainty during and after the crisis period may have different explanations.
We can speculate, for example, that strategic forecasting potentially explains forecast values in the crisis years (forecasters may have wanted to cover also less probable outcomes). On the other hand, since even the sign of future price developments was widely debated (inflation or deflation) at that time, increasing inflation uncertainty seems to be reasonable. Also, growth prospects were very difficult to assess in real time in the middle of the crisis, partly due to huge data revisions. If we have data only on the point estimates and dispersion of inflation expectations, we should perhaps not hasten to conclude that the survey data indicate that inflation expectations have been firmly anchored during and after the crisis as it was done in several occasions 6 .
The recent crisis revealed some possible caveats in the surveys. Individual forecasters may react to increasing uncertainty by adopting completely different distribution (with more skewness and kurtosis). Thus we should not focus only on the standard deviation. On the other hand, the crisis may have changed survey response rates (less survey responses are received altogether and/or the distribution is described less accurately). In the US SPF, the distribution of forecasts is particularly crude, since in terms of inflation, the average number of entries per respondent is only 3.5 (see Figure 5 ). In the ECB SPF things are somewhat better. With inflation, there has been 4.7 entries and with output growth 5.1 entries on an average. Figure 5 also shows the time-variation in the response rate in the US SPF survey. In the ECB survey data these seems to be rather clear increase in the response rate (average number of data points reported for the distribution) over time while in the US data such a change cannot really be detected. The US data on the response rate shows more erratic behavior which obviously sets some question mark to the quality of the data.
The disagreement measure works more or less in the same way as in the ECB data showing marked increase in inflation uncertainty in the middle of financial crisis but the subjective uncertainty measures (computed from the reported distributions) show very little sensitivity with respect to economic developments. On the basis of this evidence one might prefer the disagreement measure (standard deviation of individual point forecasts) as a more informative uncertainty indicator.
However, it is worth noting that disagreement is a measure of consensus across forecasters, not a measure of confidence of individual forecasters. Increasing disagreement does not reveal, whether confidence of individual respondents has changed. Even so, it is not all clear which one of these is a "better" indicator of uncertainty. Opinions seem to differ quite considerably in this respect and it may be better make the final verdict after more evidence is obtained. With the US survey, there have been several changes but here we cover only the most recent period where the questionnaire has been the same.
How does uncertainty affect inflation and output?
The question of how (inflation) uncertainty affects the economy is old and empirical analyses go back to (at least) 1970s. Thus, we may refer to the old analysis Levi and Makin (1980) that considers the role of inflation uncertainty in the Phillips curve relationship. Levi and Makin argue that the slope of the Phillips curve ought to depend on the level of inflation uncertainty (to be more precise, the slope ought to become more steeper). Using U.S data, they found evidence of this effect 7 We in fact computed the number of respondents that attached a nonzero probability to more than four inflation values (ranges). The average value for the whole data sample was 20, but the minimum was nine. More recently, the case of the uncertainty effect has forcefully been put forward by Bloom (2009) using different data sets. Here we follow a bit different approach due to our micro data setting and our emphasis on expectations altogether. The results seem, however, follow the same logic as with Bloom (2009) .
To get started, we estimate first the uncertainty-augmented New Keynesian Phillips curve using the ECB SPF data 9 . For that purpose, we use relationship (1) 
where ∆y e it , T denotes the expected growth rate of output for the current calendar year expected in period t by forecaster i. T denotes the period that is subject to the forecast. The terms ∆p e it,T and∆y e it , T refer to micro-level real-time equivalents of actual inflation and actual output growth. δ∆p it denotes the subjective individual inflation uncertainty. "Seas i " with i =1,2,3,4 denotes a seasonal dummy for quarter i. The equation is also estimated using fixed 4 quarters-ahead expectations.
The results, which are displayed on the last row of Table 2 , clearly indicate that forecast uncertainty tends to change to slope of the Phillips curve. The curve both shifts upwards and the slope also becomes (marginally) steeper. In other way round, looking at the supply response to unanticipated inflation, the results suggests -in accordance to Friedman's Nobel lecture (1977) -that higher uncertainty tends to suppress output 10 . Thus, uncertainty is not a trivial thing in terms of economic importance. Although we have dealt with inflation uncertainty it is worthwhile to remember that inflation and output growth uncertainties are highly correlated (the coefficient of correlation being about 0.8). Thus the result for inflation uncertainty may also reflect effect more general economic uncertainty (cf. Baker et al (2012) for more evidence of this). That may affect not only the slope of the Phillips curve but other relevant behavioral relationships as well.
To study the joint effect of inflation and output growth uncertainties, we explore a Lucas-type seen by scrutinizing the three-dimensional graph(s) in Figure 10 . 9 Only few studies have analyzed Phillips curves at the micro level (see Fendel et al 2011 and Tillmann 2010) . (2) where the notation is the same as in equation (1). The corresponding estimation results with different panel data estimation procedures are reported in Table 3 . They clearly show that (1) uncertainty affects output growth, (2) the impact of uncertainty on output growth effects is always negative, (3) inflation uncertainty is far more important than output growth uncertainty and (4) output growth reacts positively to unanticipated inflation as in the basic story of Lucas ( This does, however, seem not to be the case. Subsample estimates were quite similar suggesting that the uncertainty effect was present already during the early years of the EMU. In quantitative terms, we may conclude that the uncertainty effects could have cost the Euro economies almost two percent during the financial crisis (in other words, had we had zero inflation and output growth uncertainty that amount of GDP could have saved).
To be sure that the uncertainty effects do not reflect some specific estimating equation we also investigated the impact of uncertainty on output growth in the VAR framework. Thus, we estimated a VAR model from the whole panel data using the following set of variables: inflation uncertainty, expected inflation, inflation and output growth. Identification was based on the Cholesky decomposition, where we always had the uncertainty variable first. This choice may be defended on the grounds that the inflation uncertainty reflects the (credibility of the) underlying policy regime that may not be affected by current inflation and output growth. The VAR was estimated for all respondents from the data sample 1999Q1-2012Q3 using the two lags with all variables. To give some flavor of the estimations results, we just report the impulse response of ∆y with respect to the inflation uncertainty shock (Figure 8) . The nature and quantitative magnitudes of the negative response of output to inflation uncertainty comes quite close to Leduc and Liu (2012) and Baker et al (2012) again supporting the initial findings of Bloom (2009) . It may also be emphasized that the result seems to be very robust in terms of alternative orderings and lag lengths.
the supply curve coefficient and thus the price sensitiveness of supply.
Concluding remarks
This paper has examined individual inflation and real GDP growth expectations using the two professional forecasters' micro data sets, the ECB SPF and US SPF. The analyses have shown that inflation and output growth expectations are positively correlated and also the respective uncertainties are positively related. Moreover, we find evidence that inflation uncertainty is an important element in aggregate supply so that increased uncertainty leads to higher inflation and suppressed economic activity. This finding has important practical implications thinking about the current financial and economic crisis. The crisis raised inflation uncertainty to an unprecedented level in the euro area and uncertainty seems to have strengthened the sharp decrease in output in the middle of the crisis and suppressed recovery after that. If uncertainty remains at this high level it may restrain euro area output growth considerably in the future. 123 Numbers inside parentheses are corrected t-ratios. The dependent variable is inflation uncertainty, measured by disagreement (standard deviation of point estimates) or individual inflation uncertainty, δ∆p (average standard deviation of individual inflation forecasts based on subjective probability distributions). The term δ∆y refers to individual output growth uncertainty (average standard deviation of individual growth forecasts based on subjective probability distributions). .551 (26.17) .485 (22.91) .485 (22.54) 0.694 0.348 3
. 130 (17.32) . 268 (11.07) . 411 (18.13) . 450 (18.63) .401 (15.91) . 524 (21.73) .183 (5.32) 0.682 0.352 ∆p t+4 denotes expected inflation for the subsequent four quarters and ∆p t+1 the corresponding measure for the next calendar year. ∆p t+L denotes the long-run inflation expectations. The growth rate of output, ∆y e t is defined accordingly. In the Phillips curve, the dependent variable ∆p e t is expected rate of inflation for the current period. In a sense, it is the micro-level real-time equivalent of actual inflation. δ∆p is the standard deviation of individual forecasts. All equations have been estimated by OLS, the simple equations on rows 1-6 also include cross-section fixed effects. s1-s4 denote seasonal dummies. Equations on rows 10-13 are estimated with the first, second, third and fourth quarter data only. The last row represents an uncertainty-augmented hybrid Phillips curve. In all graphs, forecasts are dated according to the quarter of publications of the forecast.
Figure 2 Comparison of forecast uncertainties (ECB SPF)
. Uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of point forecasts (disagreement) and the median of the standard deviation of individual forecasts (computed from the individual distributions) in the second graph. Forecast horizon is 4 quarters ahead. Also here, dating corresponds the publications of forecasts. The series "entries/respondent" are derived by dividing the number of entries (=categories in the distribution with nonzero values) by the number of forecasters.
Figure 6 Average values of reported distributions for inflation in the ECB SPF micro data
The upper (lower) graph illustrates the left-hand (right-hand) side of the distribution of the reported values for expected inflation. Response of output growth to inflation uncertainty
